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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the outcomes of franchising regional rail passenger services in 
Germany at the global level and analyses the regional differences in the efficiency of using 
subsidies for franchised regional rail services. It provides evidence on the positive outcomes 
of the franchising approach at the global scale regarding service supply, patronage, 
subsidies paid and quality of service. The regional differences in the use of funds are studied 
by means of a two-stage efficiency analysis which includes quality of service variables and 
financial indicators. It is based on a panel dataset for the period 2003-2014 for a subsample 
of 22 public transport authorities. The analysis shows that a higher share of tendering, a 
higher share of gross contracts and longer and smaller contracts were efficiency-enhancing 
factors in the period of analysis. These impacts are found both in a model without inclusion of 
quality of service variables and models which includes them. 
Keywords: Rail franchising; efficiency analysis; data envelopment analysis; Tobit panel 
methods 
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1. Introduction 
As part of the 1994 rail reform, Germany has introduced the principle of franchising for 
regional rail services. The aims of this measure, known as “regionalization” were twofold: 
first, to achieve a clear distinction between cost-covering (or even profitable) services to be 
provided at DB’s (incumbent) own entrepreneurial risk (commercial services), and those 
services which are non-profitable but have to be operated in the public interest and therefore 
to be subsidised (PSOs), and second, to provide a sound public financing for these PSOs. 
While all long-distance rail services were defined as commercial services being not eligible 
for explicit subsidies, regional passenger services were classified as services to be 
subsidised and franchised. Since 1996 the federal states have been responsible for 
procuring these services from transport companies and for financing them within franchise 
contracts. They have considerable freedom to organise this process, and consequently the 
character of franchise contracts in Germany varies regarding the question whether they are 
granted within competitive tendering procedures or by direct negotiations; and regarding 
features such as contract duration and contract type (net versus gross contracts). 
There is evidence that the so-called regionalisation had positive impacts on service 
provision, patronage and costs (see Link and Merkert, 2011, Nash et al., 2013, Link, 2016), 
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however with considerable differences across regions. There is also a general trend on an 
increase in overall quality of service, e.g. an increase in punctuality and traveller satisfaction 
but again with remarkable regional differences. Over the last years, concerns on a decline of 
service quality have been raised. Cancellations of trains and lack of punctuality in particular 
in large conurbations such as Berlin, Stuttgart and the Rhine-Ruhr area the most prominent 
examples of declining service quality, and the crisis of the Berlin S-Bahn system since 2008 
has become well-known even outside Germany.  
Against this background, this paper examines both the overall impacts of franchising as well 
as the efficiency in using rail passenger subsidies at the regional level. It extends the 
analysis of Link (2016) in two directions. First, the analysis uses more disaggregated data on 
the level of PTAs and is therefore capable to better reflect the regional differences in the 
franchising approaches. Second, while so far only outcomes of the franchising schemes in 
terms of train-km and passenger-km were considered, the analysis presented here also 
includes quality of rail services such as punctuality and traveller satisfaction. With this focus, 
this paper contributes to an obvious gap in so far pure technical efficiency analysis studies.  
The reminder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the institutional 
framework for franchising regional rail passenger services (RRPS). Section 3 summarises 
available research on rail efficiency and in particular on the inclusion of QoS into efficiency 
analysis. Section 4 analyses the overall outcomes of franchising while section 5 presents the 
methodology, data and outcomes of an efficiency analysis at a regional level. Section 6 
reports the estimation results and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The institutional framework for franchising and quality of service  
Since 1996 the federal states have been responsible for procuring subsidised regional rail 
passenger services (RRPS) from rail companies and for financing them within franchise 
contracts (so-called regionalisation). Financially, the franchising system is based on transfers 
from the federal budget to the federal states at an annual level of about €7 billion1 (so-called 
regionalisation funds – Regionalisierungsmittel). The federal states use different institutional 
approaches to organise this process. While for example the states of Hamburg and Bremen 
preferred a central responsibility for procuring RRPSs without a separate PTA, other states 
(for example Bavaria, Thuringia, Saxony-Anhaltine, Berlin, Brandenburg) have founded one 
central PTA being responsible for all RRPs in the state, and a few countries have delegated 
responsibility to some type of municipal or regionally defined PTAs (for example Hesse, 
Baden-Wurttemberg). While the procedures of awarding contracts (directly negotiated versus 
tendered), and contract controlling as well as all other day-to-day management tasks are 
under the responsibility of the PTAs, the federal states decide about the general strategy 
(intensity and pace of tendering, financial aids for rolling stock), the allocation of funds to the 
PTAs, and whether to spend additional money from the federal states general budgets for 
regional rail passenger transport. They also have some freedom to decide how the 
                                                          
1 In 2014, the final year for most of the results presented in this paper, regionalisation funds were €7.3 billion. In 
2015 the funds amounted at €7.4 billion and for 2016 around €8 billion were available with an agreed increase of 
1.8% p.a. in subsequent years. 
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regionalisation subsidies from the Federal Government are split between operating subsidies 
granted to TOCs, and investments or – to some extent – to other public transport. 
Currently, there are 27 regional authorities (PTAs) responsible for procuring regional rail 
passenger services. They differ regarding the area to be served, and there are also 
differences in the number of PTAs within the federal states. The legal framework gives – 
within the requirements of EU legislation - significant freedom to PTAs, allowing to award 
service contracts using open tenders, non-open tenders and negotiations. Service contracts 
have different contractual forms and degrees of service specifications, varying contract 
durations and different sizes (from single lines up to large regional network bundles). All 
regional rail services are awarded as public service contracts on a non-exclusive basis. The 
decentralised institutional set-up implies a lack of a general standard for regional rail service 
contracts. PTAs rather adapt contract features to regional conditions and experience. 
Public service contracts for regional rail passenger services are usually based on detailed 
specifications, although with differences between PTAs. Examples are requests for 
synchronised and coordinated timetables, service frequency, operating hours (first and last 
train), through-ticketing and acceptance of the DB tariff or the tariff of a so-called 
Verkehrsverbund. The contracts also contain detailed definitions on quality of service (QoS) 
such as type and age of rolling stock, required service staff in the trains, train length, number 
of carriages etc. as well as bonus/malus payments and penalty management for both the 
amount of train-km and patronage and for quality management. The lack of general 
standards for rail service contracts implies that definitions of service quality to be achieved 
and concepts of quality measurement and reporting vary between PTAs.   
 
3. Available research 
Most of the available studies on rail productivity and efficiency focus on the impact of vertical 
integration versus vertical separation (see for example Ivaldi and McCullough, 2001, Bitzan, 
2003, Jensen and Stelling, 2007, Growitsch and Wetzel, 2009, Cantos et al., 1999, Cantos et 
al., 2010 and Mituzani and Uranishi, 2010). Another stream of research on rail efficiency 
deals with the impact of competitive tendering and franchising and on contractual 
arrangements (see Driessen et al., 2006, Cantos et al., 2010, Nash and Smith, 2006, Affuso 
and Newbery, 2002, Beck, 2011, Lalive and Schmutzler, 2008, 2011, Hunold and Wolf, 2012 
and Link, 2016). The majority of studies, in particular those on vertical separation, but also 
most of the studies on the impact of competitive tendering are based on international data at 
country-level, mostly obtained from UIC statistics. A few studies on competitive tendering are 
based on either full samples of franchising contracts in a single country (see Nash and 
Smith, 2006, Affuso and Newbery, 2002 for UK franchise contracts and Link, 2016 for 
Germany) or on subsamples (see Beck, 2011, Lalive and Schmutzler, 2008, 2011, Hunold 
and Wolf, 2012 for Germany). All of these studies (except Link, 2016) focus on the impact of 
vertical separation and competitive tendering respectively on rail companies’ efficiency rather 
than on the use of public spending for rail. Link (2016) shows by means of a two-stage 
efficiency analysis at the level of the German federal states that differences in the efficiency 
of using regionalisation subsidies between the federal states are determined by the share of 
services awarded under competitive tendering, and by contractual designs such as gross 
versus net contracts, contract duration and contract size.  
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Research on the incorporation of quality of service into cost function and efficiency analysis 
is scarce, given the difficulties in defining quality criteria, collecting the necessary indicators 
and incorporating them into the tools of efficiency analysis. The few available studies are 
mainly concentrated on the electricity sector, presumably because of the development and 
refinement of incentive-based regulation schemes where quality of service has started to 
attract attention. In studies of the electricity sector, quality of service is usually represented 
by one or two indicators such as electricity outages or interruption time (see for example 
Korhonen and Syrjänen, 2003, CEPA, 2003, Ajodhia et. al., 2004, Growitsch et al., 2005, 
Giannakis et al., 2005).  Although the relationship between organisational forms, franchising 
and competitive tendering in public transport and traveller satisfaction as an indicator of 
quality of service has been gaining attention over the last years (see for example Mouwen 
and Rietveld, 2013, Zhang et al., 2016, Paha et al, 2013), to the best of our knowledge 
quality aspects have so far not been included in any analysis of productivity and efficiency in 
rail or public transport. Rare examples of benchmarking and efficiency studies in the 
transport sector which include QoS indicators refer to air transport. Assaf et al. (2014) 
include airport delays into an efficiency analysis for airports and Merkert and Assaf (2015) 
measure airport efficiency in a combined quality/profitability indicator which includes traveller 
satisfaction. The rather small research evidence and application experience implies that any 
state-of-the-art approach of incorporating quality into efficiency analysis is lacking. Most often 
QoS is reflected within indicators which measure quality reductions such as outages, 
interruption times, customer minutes lost or airport delays. Usually they are treated as 
undesirable or “bad” inputs which have to be minimised against given output levels. Merkert 
and Assaf (2015) is the only example of including a QoS measure as output.    
Table 1: Transport performance in regional rail passenger transport 
 
 
Year Train-km 
(Million) 
non-DB 
companies 
(%) 
Pass-km 
(billion) 
non-DB 
companies 
(%) 
Hirschmann 
herfindahl 
Index1) 
1996 544 n.a. 36.1 n.a. 94.83 
1997 588 n.a. 37.2 n.a. 93.86 
1998 563 4.4 38.1 2.1 91.75 
1999 581 5.5 38.9 2.4 90.02 
2000 591 6.4 39.2 2.6 87.94 
2001 599 8.2 40.4 3.2 87.10 
2002 604 8.6 38.2 3.9 86.10 
2003 619 9.9 39.7 4.5 83.36 
2004 628 11.9 40.5 6.0 79.19 
2005 633 13.3 43.1 9.7 76.02 
2006 637 15.2 44.5 9.4 72.27 
2007 633 16.3 44.9 9.6 69.94 
2008 630 18.4 47.0 10.0 66.85 
2009 630 20.2 47.4 11.2 64.79 
2010 636 21.7 47.9 13.6 62.47 
2011 641 24.0 49.9 15.2 59.41 
2012 642 25.2 51.4 15.6 57.27 
2013 644 26.6 52.8 17.4 55.12 
2014 651 27.3 53.4 18.3 54.30 
1) Based on train-km. 
Sources: Mofair 2009. 2014; figures for pass-km taken from Peter 2008. sources quoted 
there:1994-2002 Progtrans 2005. figures for pass-km  2003-20014: DB AG. 
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4. Overall outcomes of franchising 
As of 2014, about 650 million train-km and 53 billion pass-km p.a are operated under more 
than 260 franchise contracts (table 1). Compared with 1996, the start of the regionalisation 
approach, service delivery in terms of train-km has increased by almost 20%. This is not 
necessarily a result of competition but rather an outcome of the sound financing of RPSs, 
which led to an increase of services ordered and funded by regional authorities. The share of 
RRPSs awarded to non-DB companies, mostly by means of competitive 
procurement/tendering procedures, was 4% in 1998 and has increased continuously since 
then. Overall, in 2014 the market share of non-DB companies made up 27% of train-km but 
only about 18% of passenger-km. As a result, market concentration measured by the HHI 
index has decreased. The non-DB companies operating RRPSs in Germany can be grouped 
into three types: 
• Internationally operating (usually bus and train) companies. Most of them are listed at 
the stock exchange (Veolia,) or have at least a remarkable share of private investors 
(Keolis with 30%, BeNEX with 49%). 
• Rail companies of federal states or municipalities (for example Hessische 
Landesbahn). 
• Foreign National rail companies (for example SBB, NedRailways, Ferrovie dello 
Stato, SNCF) often by holding shares in other companies. 
 
Figure 1: German and international competitors of DB in regional rail passenger 
transport (in mill. train-km) 
 Source: Author’s database. 
The most obvious trend is the internationalization of the German rail passenger market (see 
figure 1) which is due to its comfortable financial support very attractive. In 2015, about 45% 
of all train-km operated by non-DB companies were run by internationally operating 
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companies and foreign national rail carrier.2 This trend towards internationalisation can to 
some extent also be found in the British and Swedish rail market as well as in bus transport 
(see van de Velde 2003). 
The overall subsidy spent for regional rail passenger services has decreased both in relation 
to train-km and passenger-km (figure 2) indicating a more efficient use of funds. This is 
driven by the provision of RRPS by non-DB companies at lower production costs and by a  
productivity increase of DB as a result of competitive pressure. The significantly larger fall in 
cost per passenger-km suggests not only a more efficient use in terms of provided services 
but also a better use of services by passengers.  While the first effect is a result of 
competitive pressure, the second effect can be attributed to the regionalisation approach 
where the decentralised competence of regional authorities succeeded to bring service 
provision better in balance with transport demand.  
 
Figure 2: Development of overall regionalisation subsidies per transport unit 
(1996=100) 
Source: Regionalisation law, BMVI Transport in figures (various volumes), author’s database and author’s calculations. 
 
Centrally hold information on quality of service is not available in Germany. Even though 
many PTAs have established quality management and reporting schemes (usually starting in 
2003),these are based on different concepts and have a different degree of public 
availability. The available data compiled from these different sources and supplemented by 
own calculations provide some evidence that overall quality of service has improved. 
Punctuality and traveller satisfaction have increased since 2003 (figure 3), however, with a 
remarkable variation across PTAs. It should be noted that punctuality as shown in figure 3 is 
based on different definitions of delays (the minutes of delay accepted range from 3 to 6 
minutes depending on the contract design adopted by PTAs) and reflect the differences in 
                                                          
2 Rail operators were classified based on majority of ownership (also for parent companies). 
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defining an acceptable service quality across regions. Traveller satisfaction data are based 
on the traveller satisfaction index collected by the survey institute INFAS. This data was 
transformed to a 1-5 scale in order to enable its further disaggregation to PTAs which was 
necessary in some cases and done by using the ratios between PTAs satisfaction index and 
the INFAs satisfaction index.  
 
Figure 3: Quality of service in regional rail passenger transport in Germany – 2003-
2014  
Traveller satisfaction1) % Trains arriving on time2) 
 
 1) Measured on a scale from 1 (very satisfied) to 5 (not satisfied at all).- 2) % of trains arriving with less 
than a defined acceptable delay. 
Sources: INFAS traveller survey data, PTAs quality reporting schemes, own calculations. 
 
5. Analysis of efficiency in using subsidies across PTAs  
While the overall figures show improvements in both the level of subsides per train-km and 
pas-km as well as in punctuality and traveller satisfaction, there are considerable differences 
in these outcome indicators across federal states and PTAs. This section presents an 
analysis of these differences by means of a two-stage efficiency analysis. 
5.1.Methodology 
The approach in this paper follows the one taken in Link (2016) in so far as - in contrast to 
studies on rail companies’ efficiency - the efficiency in using rail passenger subsidies are 
analysed. This different research focus implies a different formulation of inputs than in 
traditional rail efficiency analysis, e.g. the models do not include the typical inputs such as 
labour, material (e.g. energy) and capital (e.g. rolling stock, other facilities) as variables, but 
define monetary subsidies (further disaggregated into operating subsidies, investment 
subsidies and infrastructure charges) as inputs. 
This paper employs a two-stage bootstrapped efficiency analysis with a DEA application in 
the first stage and a Tobit panel model for explaining the first-stage efficiency scores. Details 
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on the methodology are given in Link (2016, 2017) and are here only briefly summarised. 
The first stage DEA is a deterministic, non-parametric method to specify the efficient 
production frontier3. Based on observed inputs (w) and outputs (y) for a set of N decision-
making units (DMUs), relative efficiency scores for each unit are derived by searching for the 
most efficient DMUs in the sample, e.g. those units with the lowest input levels for a given 
level of output4. These form the efficiency frontier which envelopes all observed data points 
in the sample. Efficiency of each DMU is measured by the distance between the single 
observation and the frontier. The main reason for choosing DEA as the tool of analysis in this 
paper was its capability of handling multiple outputs and inputs and of dealing with data 
which are on different units. This was a major advantage for incorporating QoS variables 
which are on different measurement units than the conventional variables at physical or 
monetary units, and which are also amongst themselves on different units. Furthermore, 
DEA does not require any assumptions about cost minimisation or profit maximisation or 
about the functional form of the frontier and does not require price information. Caveats of 
the method include the potential danger of deeming too many observations as inefficient 
because the concept fails to recognise nonconvexities of the envelope (see for example De 
Borger and Kerstens, 1996). A major problem is the deterministic nature of the method which 
allocates variations in firm’s performance exclusively to inefficiency, and which lacks 
statistical inference. This, however, can be solved by bootstrapping procedures to correct for 
the potential bias in the estimated distance function from the true frontier and to calculate 
confidence intervals (see for example Simar and Wilson, 2000).  
There are two essential assumptions for the specification of the DEA model to be taken: 
firstly, an assumption regarding the ability of firms to influence either inputs or outputs (input 
versus output orientation of the model) and secondly, constant versus variable returns to 
scale. In this paper, an input oriented distance function is chosen, justified by the fact that the 
federal states and their PTAs can rather decide on the level of subsidies than on output 
levels such as train-km and passenger-km which are substantially influenced by long-term 
planning and contracts as well as by macro-economic and demographic factors. It should be 
noted that according to Coelli and Perelman (1999) output and input-oriented models 
estimate exactly the same frontier surface and therefore, identify the same set of DMUs as 
efficient, however, the scores themselves differ. They also show that for railways the 
orientation does not matter as much as it does for other industries. Regarding the returns to 
scale specification, the VRS specification is the preferred one, given that the German rail 
sector is, as most rail industries in other countries, characterised by imperfect competition, 
budget restrictions and regulatory deficits.  
Finally, a bootstrapping approach based on Simar and Wilsson (1998) was applied in order 
to obtain confidence intervals and to overcome the potential problem of biased results in the 
second-stage regressions. The bias-corrected results for the efficiency scores were obtained 
from 1000 iterations. 
For the analysis presented in this paper, four output variables and three input variables were 
defined. Based on common practice in studies of rail efficiency, this paper uses train-km and 
                                                          
3 Details on the method can be found in Charnes et al. (2013). 
4 The performance of a DMU is defined as the ratio between the weighted sums of outputs and inputs whereby 
the weights are allocated within the DEA model. 
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passenger-km as output variables. For QoS, the indicators punctuality of trains and traveller 
satisfaction were considered, whereby the first represents an objective measure of QoS 
while the second is a measure of perceived QoS. The definition of inputs contains three 
monetary variables: operating subsidies, investment subsidies (both directly to be influenced 
by the DMUs) and infrastructure charges to be paid (exogenously given by the infrastructure 
provider). The paper presents results for three DEA models. All of them use train-km and 
passenger-km as output variables but differ regarding the specification and inclusion of QoS 
indicators (see table 2).  
Table 2: DEA models in this paper 
 V0 V1 V2 
Inputs    
Operating subsidy X X X 
Investment subsidy X X X 
Infrastructure charges X X X 
%age of unpunctual trains   X 
Outputs    
Train-km  X X X 
Passenger-km X X X 
Punctuality  X  
Traveller satisfaction  X X 
 
Following previous studies such as Merkert et al., 2010, Cantos et al., 2010, this paper 
regresses the efficiency scores obtained from the first-stage DEA approach against a set of 
independent explanatory variables in order to explain differences in the efficiency between 
the federal states. The explanatory variables contain two types of data. First, a set of policy 
variables which reflect the decisions of the PTAs how to organise rail franchising. To these 
variables belong the share of tendered train-km, the share of train-km under net contracts, 
the average size of contracts (expressed in train-km) and the average contract duration. 
Second, environmental variables which cannot be influenced by the DMUs such as the 
population density, car density and the rate of unemployment.  
Since the efficiency scores are bound in the (0,1) interval and represent a censored variable 
a corner solution model, e.g. a Tobit model (named after Tobin, 1958) was applied. For the 
type of data used in this paper, the basic Tobit model was extended to a panel context and,   
as common, the two standard approaches for incorporating individual heterogeneity were 
tested, e.g. the fixed and random effects model. Details are given in Link (2016, 2017). 
Finally, it has to be noted that, following Greene (1993) the efficiency scores Ωi were 
censored at zero in order to avoid concentrating of variables at unity. 
 
5.2 The data 
Although the regionalisation subsidies are paid from tax money, in Germany centrally held 
and publicly accessible data at a desirable level of disaggregation for an econometric 
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analysis (e.g. contract level, PTA level, level of federal states) is not available. Link (2016) 
has used a unique database with the 16 German federal states as observation units which 
contained variables for train-km and passenger-km of regional rail services, subsidies and 
fare revenues, and data on the characteristics of contracts (net versus gross contracts, 
tendered versus non-tendered contracts, network size, contract duration). For the purpose of 
this paper, this database was filled with new data on investment subsidies and quality 
indicators, was disaggregated to cover the 27 PTAs and extended to cover the period until 
2014. The data collection procedures, data sources and the necessary own calculations are 
described in Link (2016, 2017). All monetary data was deflated to constant prices of 2010 by 
using the price deflator for regional rail services. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics – for 22 PTAs  and 28 PTAs 2003-2014 
 Variable Unit Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Population density   P_SKM inhabitants/skm 564.7 859.1 68.8 3881.1 
   (541.9) (797.3) (68.8) (3881.1) 
Train-km TR_KM million km 25.97 24.33 1.81 123.3 
   (22.63) (22.71) (1.81) (123.3) 
Passenger-km P_KM million km 1892.5 1999.1 61.9 8902.0 
   (1585.0) (1875.7) (61.9) (8902.0) 
Share of tendered train-km  TEND % 22.5 24.8 0.0 100.0 
   (23.4) (25.5) (0.0) (100.0) 
Share of train-km under net 
contracts 
NET % 81.2 30.3 0.0 100.0 
  (80.4) (31.7) (0.0) (100.0) 
Average contract size SIZE million train-km p.a. 2.98 2.09 0.52 10.14 
   (2.68) (1.99) (0.42) (10.14) 
Average contract duration DUR years 11.9 2.9 5.9 18.2 
   (11.8) (2.8) (4.5) (18.2) 
Operation subsidies* S million € 91.33 84.01 3.18 463.93 
   (80.25) (78.37) (3.18) (463.92) 
Share of infrastructure 
charges** in total subsidies 
INFRA % 56.7 8.9 35.4 80.6 
  (56.8) (9.)2 (35.4) (82.6) 
Figures for 28 PTAs in brackets.- N=264 for dataset with 22 PTAs, N=336 for dataset with 28 PTAs.- . *) At 2010 prices. Adapted 
by fare revenues from gross contracts.- **)Infrastructure charges paid for the use of tracks and stations represent items which are 
paid by rail operators to rail rack providers (typically DB Netz). They are passed through to PTAs and are part of the subsidies paid 
by PTAs to operators within franchise contracts. 
 
The dataset finally used covered the period from 2003 to 2014. The decision of not using the 
data for the full period since 1996 was taken for two reasons. First, QoS indicators were only 
available since 2003. Second, the period since 2003 is of special interest since in 2003 PTAs 
have closed large  long-term RRPS contracts with DB within direct negotiations due to size 
problems and the risk of having no sufficient bidders for such large contracts. However, all of 
these long-term contracts contain a time path of reducing train-km within this contracts and 
tendering them stepwise in order to achieve a smooth transfer to competitive tendering and 
to guarantee a sufficient number of bids.  
Since not for all PTAs QoS indicators were available, the final dataset covered 22 out of 27 
PTAs. The PTA Berlin-Brandenburg was finally split and treated as two PTAs since the 
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greater Berlin area and the Brandenburg area are different federal states and show large 
differences regarding population density, and in particular regarding the QoS indicators 
where the Berlin S-Bahn crisis with very low punctuality figures and low customer satisfaction 
would overlay and distort the figures for the Brandenburg area. 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the relevant variables for all PTAs (where 28 
PTAs instead of 27 are shown due to the split up of the PTA for Berlin/Brandenburg) and for 
the final dataset with 22 PTAs (where again the PTA for Berlin/Brandenburg was spilt up). 
The differences in variable means between the two datasets (full and 22 PTAs) are not large 
and thus it seems feasible to proceed with the reduced 22 PTAs dataset. However, some 
caution is necessary when interpreting disaggregated figures in the previous section, for 
example for the co-called city states because one of the three city state PTAs (Bremen) is 
not included (lack of QoS variables). 
 
5.3 Estimation results 
Table 4 summarises the estimated and the bias-corrected scores for technical efficiency 
obtained with the three DEA models under the assumptions of variable and constant returns 
to scale. As to be expected, the average bias-corrected technical efficiency scores are higher 
for models V1 and V2 where two QoS variables are included since the number of outputs 
increase by two and by one respectively. The overall level of DEA scores is in line with 
previous literature on rail efficiency (see Growitsch and Wetzel, 2009; Merkert et al., 2010, 
Cantos et al., 2010; Link, 2016). 
 Table 4: DEA results 
 VRS CRS 
 ES ES– bias corrected ES ES – bias corrected 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
V0 0.8924 0.0808 0.8722 0.1233 0.8391 0.0888 0.8443 0.0930 
V1 0.9189 0.0789 0.9189 0.0789 0.8459 0.0899 0.8488 0.0859 
V2 0.9235 0.0753 0.9283 0.0720 0.9083 0.0800 0.9103 0.0788 
V0: Base model - DEA model with two outputs (train-km and passenger-km).- V1: DEA model with four outputs 
(train-km, passenger-km, punctuality, traveler satisfaction. 
 
Based on the preferred specification of variable returns to scale and without considering QoS 
variables (base model V0) the results suggest that the average PTA could save subsidies in 
a range of around 13 per cent, when considering QoS variables this saving potential reduces 
at 8%. Generally, these potential savings should be interpreted with caution. First of all, 
including QoS variables increases the number of outputs and more DMUs are deemed 
efficient. Second and more general, the saving potential has to be interpreted as the 
maximum possible saving if all PTAs would face identical conditions (population density, 
level of infrastructure charges to be paid etc.) as the most efficient PTAs which is not the 
case (see the considerable variation of indicators in table 2). The disaggregated technical 
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efficiency scores for different types of PTAs in table 4 underline this: First, the disaggregated 
efficiency scores for the city states5 (the PTAs of Hamburg and Berlin) are higher than for the 
remaining PTAs. This is an expected effect because the city states represent large urban 
areas with high population density allowing a bundling of rail traffic and interchanges with 
other public transport which makes regional rail traffic attractive. Second, similar to the 
findings in Link (2016) the PTAs in the Western part of Germany are more efficient in using 
rail subsidies than the East German PTAs. Interestingly, these East-West differences are still 
persistent in the period from 2003-20014. Amongst the potential reasons for such differences 
are the ongoing economic problems in East Germany and the lower population density. 
Furthermore, the East German PTAs had during the major part of the observation period to 
pay higher infrastructure charges than most of the West German PTAs due to the regional 
surcharges levied by DB Netz until 2011 for low-density lines in particular in East Germany.  
Table 5:  Disaggregated efficiency scores 
 DEA-V0 DEA-V1 DEA-V2 
 ES SD ES SD ES SD 
Hamburg, Berlin 0.9219 0.0714 0.9351 0.0674 0.9379 0.0628 
Other PTAs 0.8672 0.1262 0.9175 0.0798 0.9221 0.0762 
Out of these:       
   East German PTAs 0.7636 0.1437 0.8773 0.0866 0.8855 0.0858 
   West German PTAs 0.9129 0.0841 0.9339 0.0696 0.9378 0.0653 
V0: Base model - DEA model with two outputs (train-km and passenger-km).- V1: DEA model with four outputs 
(train-km, passenger-km, punctuality, traveler satisfaction.) .-  V1: DAE model with three outputs (train-km, 
passenger-km, traveler satisfaction) and punctuality as bad input.-All figures are based on VRS assumption and 
are bias-corrected scores obtained from 1000 bootstrapping iterations. 
 
The inclusion of QoS variables had two effects. First, the difference between city states and 
remaining PTAs and between Eastern and Western PTAs decrease considerably. 
Apparently, including punctuality and traveller satisfaction introduces an important dimension 
into efficiency analysis, and punctuality problems but also the loss of customer satisfaction 
due to unreliable and crowded trains in the large conurbations and also in some Western 
PTAs change efficiency scores. Second, the rankings of PTAs change (table 6). In model V1 
only five and in model V2 only four out of 22 PTAs keep their rank from the basic model while 
for remaining PTAs the ranking changes partly considerably. In particular East German PTAs 
improve their rankings due to better punctuality and higher customer satisfaction.  
Table 7 reports the results of the Tobit panel models which use the efficiency scores from the 
three DEA models with and without QoS variables under the VRS assumption as dependent 
variable. Since only a random effects model has produced significant and plausible 
estimates, this type of Tobit panel model is the preferred on and reported here. The scale 
factors for obtaining marginal effects are given at the bottom of table 7 and are near unity, 
                                                          
5 The PTA for Bremen, the third of the three so-called German city states had to be excluded from the analysis 
since QoS variables were only available for the last three years. 
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indicating that the coefficients can be interpreted as almost equal to the marginal effects 
(evaluated at the mean of the exogenous variables). 
Table 6: Rankings of PTAs 
PTA number Model V0 Model V1 Model V2 ΔV1,V0 ΔV2,V0 
1 20 19 18 -1 -2 
2 6 8 9 2 3 
3 22 22 22 0 0 
4 19 16 16 -3 -3 
5 18 15 14 -3 -4 
6 17 20 20 3 3 
7 11 14 15 3 4 
8 8 11 12 3 4 
9 7 10 11 3 4 
10 16 17 17 1 1 
11 14 9 7 -5 -7 
12 15 21 21 6 6 
13 21 18 19 -3 -2 
14 4 3 3 -1 -1 
15 5 5 5 0 0 
16 1 1 1 0 0 
17 9 13 13 4 4 
18 3 4 4 1 1 
19 10 6 6 -4 -4 
20 2 2 2 0 0 
21 12 12 10 0 -2 
22 13 7 8 -6 -5 
 
Since the dependent variable was obtained from the transformed efficiency scores, negative 
signs of the parameters indicate that the respective variables have a positive impact on 
efficiency. In both the models with and without considering QoS, all coefficients (except NET 
in the base model) are significant at 1per cent level and have the same sign6. However, the 
sizes of coefficients differ considerably between the three models.  
Overall, the estimation results are intuitively plausible and confirm expectations from theory. 
They are also in line with the findings for the German federal states during the period from 
1996 to 2010 reported in Link (2016).  As reported there, a higher share of tendered train-km, 
a lower share of train-km operated under net contracts, a longer contract duration and a 
smaller contract size explain higher efficiency scores. When using DEA scores obtained from 
models with QoS variables the size of coefficients changes while keeping the sign and thus 
the general direction of explanation. Furthermore, the approach of including QoS variables 
(model V1 versus model V2) does not lead to larger deviations: The coefficients in both 
model V1 and V2 are in a similar range. In both model V1 and V2 the coefficients for SIZE 
and for TEND are smaller than those obtained with the basic model (around half and around 
two thirds respectively, and the coefficients for DURATION and NET are higher (doubling 
and even quadrupling in size). This suggests that the efficiency enhancing effect of tendering 
                                                          
6 Models which included the variables car density suffered from collinearity problems and therefore these 
variables were removed from the models. 
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is smaller when considering QoS variables but contractual features are gaining in 
importance. The efficiency enhancing effect of a longer contract duration and of a lower 
share of net contracts is strengthened in both models with QoS variables while the efficiency 
enhancing effect of a smaller contract size is lower. These results indicate that QoS is rather 
driven by contractual arrangements although competitive tendering keeps its positive effect 
on efficiency. 
Table 7: Results of the second stage Tobit regressions – random effects models 
 Random effects – basic model Random effects – model V1 Random effects – model V2 
Variable coefficient Std error P(z)>Z coefficient Std error P(z)>Z coefficient Std error P(z)>Z 
P_SKM  -0.00011*** 0.00006 0.0000   -0.00039*** 0.00006 0.0000 -0.00038* 0.00002 0.0763 
DUR -0.00229** 0.00115 0.0473   -0.00515*** 0.00166 0.0019 -0.00450** 0.00217 0.0382 
NET    0.02273 0.02170 0.2950    0.09914*** 0.02206 0.0000  0.08436*** 0.02925 0.0038 
TEND  -0.17421*** 0.02128 0.0000   -0.12049*** 0.02478 0.0000 -0.12298*** 0.02961 0.0000 
SIZE   0.02890*** 0.00243 0.0000    0.01394*** 0.00210 0.0014  0.01165*** 0.00209 0.0000 
Const    0.18103*** 0.02792 0.0000    0.08180** 0.03389 0.0158  0.08038* 0.04646 0.0836 
Sigma(v)  0.10155*** 0.00591 0.0000    0.05558*** 0.00188 0.0000 0.05282*** 0.00247 0.0000 
Sigma(u)  0.09436*** 0.01948 0.0000    0.0712*** 0.00622 0.0000 0.06007*** 0.00597 0.0000 
Scale 
factor 0.9903 0.9986 0.9371 
LogL 203.4 203.3 212.1 
*** significant at 1% level.- **significant at 5% level. 
 
As in Link (2016) the negative impact of net contracts on efficiency in both the model with 
and without consideration of QoS seems to be counterintuitive at a first glance. Net contracts 
would be expected to give incentives to the operator to increase patronage and, in order to 
do so, also improve quality of service. An explanation might be the special German situation 
where in 2003 all PTAs closed large long-term contracts with DB within direct negotiations as 
net contracts. This might have led to a situation where DB was able to receive rather high net 
subsidies, which is reflected in lower efficiency scores. PTAs had finally to spend more public 
money for net contracts than for gross contracts for which the fare revenues collected by the 
PTA reduce the subsidy level - even though the net subsidy per train-km is per definition 
lower than the gross subsidy when not considering fare revenues. 
As expected and in line with Link (2016), a higher population density has a positive effect on 
the efficient use of subsidies. Further variables (dummies for urban areas and for East 
German PTAs, HH index, car density, GDP) were not significant and are not reported here. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has analysed the outcomes of the German franchising scheme for regional rail 
passenger services at the global level regarding service supply, patronage, subsidies paid 
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and quality of service. With increases in all of these outcome indicators the franchising 
approach with its regional focus (regionalisation) can be considered as successful. The 
differences in these indicators across regions have stimulated research analysing the 
regional differences in the use of subsidies and the factors responsible for these differences 
by means of a two-stage efficiency analysis. This analysis combines for the first time 
conventional input and output measures with QoS variables.  It considers a subsample of 22 
out of 27 PTAs over the period from 2003 to 2014. As in any econometric application, the 
results naturally reflect the specific empirical situation under study, in this paper the German 
rail franchising during a period which was characterised by the closure of large long-term 
contracts with DB without competitive tendering and a stepwise tendering of parts of these 
services in subsequent years. Bearing this note of caution in mind, the following general 
policy conclusions can be drawn which confirm those obtained earlier in Link (2016): First, 
the findings suggest that a higher share of tendered rail services would significantly increase 
the efficiency in using the available public funds to provide these services. Second, the paper 
provides evidence that a higher share of gross contracts has a positive impact on efficiency. 
One potential reason for this is the fact that the majority of net contracts was awarded 
without any competitive tendering, and the effect could therefore be overlapped with the 
effect of lacking competitive pressure. Third, the analysis suggests that contract duration, 
even though longer when compared with the period from 1996-2010, should be longer than 
currently (on average 11.9 years) to guarantee a more efficient use of public funds, a finding 
which confirms ongoing debates and critiques in Germany on too short contract periods for 
amortising rolling stock, in particular when keeping the problems since the financial crises in 
mind. Furthermore, smaller contracts than in the period of analysis (on average 2.3 million 
train-km p.a.) would potentially increase efficiency.  
The most important finding is that although including quality of service into the analysis 
changes the ranking of DMus partly considerably, the general explanatory factors for 
efficiency remain the same. However, while keeping their sign and thus the direction of 
impact, their absolute size (and thus their weight of impact) changes. Apparently, rather 
contractual features gain in importance while keeping the positive impact of competitive 
tendering. These findings are robust regarding the approach of taking into account quality of 
service. However, more research is needed on QoS, in particular a systematic approach 
which quality indicators should be considered and how they should be included into the 
models. Important variables (such as the condition of the tracks and stations causing delays 
or trains cancellations, subsidies spent on rolling stock) which are currently not available 
would need to be included to obtain a better understanding of the relationship between 
technical efficiency of using subsidies and quality of service. 
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